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Real Wages and Labor Productivity in 
Britain and Germany, 1871–1938: A Unified 
Approach to the International Comparison of 
Living Standards 
 
STEPHEN BROADBERRY AND CARSTEN BURHOP 
 
Throughout the period 1871–1938, the average British worker was better off  
than the average German worker, but there were significant differences between 
major sectors. For the aggregate economy, the real wage gap was about the same 
as the labor productivity gap, but again there were important sectoral differences. 
Compared to their productivity, German industrial workers were poorly paid, 
whereas German agricultural and service sector employees were overpaid. This 
affected the competitiveness of the two countries in these sectors. There were also 
important differences in comparative real wages by skill level, affecting the extent 
of poverty. 
 
nternational comparisons of living standards are often conducted using 
data on labor productivity or GDP per capita, while national debates on 
living standards are frequently conducted in terms of real wages. Since 
real wages and labor productivity do not always yield the same picture, 
there is a need for a unified approach to the international comparison of 
living standards, which covers both real wages and labor productivity.  
 Recently, a broad consensus has been reached regarding the 
comparative performance of the British and German economies during 
the second half the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century, taking labor productivity as the measure.1 At the outset, 
Germany lagged behind in all three main economic sectors—agriculture, 
industry, and services—but its industrial labor productivity converged 
towards British levels at the turn of the century and hovered around 
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1 Broadberry, “Explaining Anglo -German Productivity”; Broadberry and Burhop,  
“Comparative Productivity” and “Resolving”; Ritschl, “Anglo-German Industrial Productivity”; 
and Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer, “Censuses.” 
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British levels until World War II.2 In agriculture and services, Germany 
lagged behind throughout the period. Consequently, economy-wide labor 
productivity was lower in Germany than in Britain.3 Any remaining 
disagreements in this area are now relatively minor, and do not affect the 
qualitative conclusions.4  
 In a perfectly competitive world, we would expect comparative  
real wages to reflect comparative labor productivity levels in each sector 
as well as at the aggregate level. In practice, however, there are good 
reasons to expect a wedge between real wages and real labor 
productivity, for at least three reasons.5 First, if the economies are  
not fully competitive, differences in the markup between the countries 
and over time can induce varying deviations of wages from marginal 
productivity. Second, the bargaining power of firms versus workers can 
also vary between countries and over time. This affects the wage-
productivity relation since the wage is a weighted average of the average 
product of labor and its opportunity costs, with the weight of the former 
being equal to the workers’ bargaining power.6 Third, labor adjustment 
costs can also drive a wedge between the marginal product of labor and 
the wage, since the marginal costs then include the wage, the adjustment 
costs, and the future expected adjustment costs. 
 The historical literature suggests that these theoretical reasons indeed 
affected the relationship between wages and labor productivity in Britain 
and Germany. The impact of cartels on the economic development of 
Imperial Germany is an evergreen of economic history and these cartels 
might have led to a higher markup in Germany compared to Britain. 
Moreover, increased bargaining power and resulting changes in the labor 
share were a key element in the “Borchardt controversy” about the 
origins of high unemployment and weak investment in interwar 
Germany.7  
 Beyond theoretical reasons, simple measurement differences might 
result in differences between comparative labor productivity and 
comparative real wages within sectors. First, real labor productivity is 
compared using purchasing power parities (PPPs) from the output side, 
whereas real wages are usually compared using expenditure side PPPs. If 
all goods and services were tradable without barriers, the two PPPs 
should be equal. However, if some goods or services are not freely 
tradable and if the degree of trade barriers is different for consumers 
 
2 Broadberry, Productivity Race and “United States.” 
3 Broadberry, “United States” and Market Services. 
4 Ritschl, “Anglo-German Industrial Productivity”; and Broadberry and Burhop, “Resolving.” 
5 Bentolila and Saint-Paul, “Explaining Movements.” 
6 See Blachard and Fischer, Lectures, chap. 9, for a formal model.  
7 Borchardt, “Zwangslagen.” 
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compared to producers, the two PPPs can deviate from each other. 
Second, the time series of real wages are generated using consumer price 
indices, whereas the time series of real labor productivity are generated 
using wholesale price indices or volume indicators. For the same reasons 
as in the case of PPPs, wholesale and consumer price indices can deviate 
from each other.  
 Most of the recent work on comparative living standards in Britain and 
Germany during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been based on 
income per capita or output per employee, neglecting the functional 
distribution of income and therefore the comparative level of real wages. 
By contrast, the evolution of real wages and the functional distribution of 
income have played significant roles in national debates over the standard 
of living, as illustrated by a number of controversies. In the British 
literature, the controversy over the development of real wages during the 
Industrial Revolution shows little sign of quietening down, while the 
extent of poverty in the first half of the twentieth century continues to be 
hotly debated.8 On the other hand, there is no such “standard of living 
controversy” in Germany and it is generally accepted that German real 
wages increased substantially during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.9 Moreover, most authors agree that Germany 
improved its international competitiveness as a low-wage country and 
benefited from technological innovation in a number of science-based 
industries.10 In addition, there has been a major debate in Germany over 
the loss of competitiveness after World War I and over the extent to 
which real wages were too high compared to labor productivity.11 A full 
understanding of comparative standards of living therefore requires an 
analysis of both real wages and labor productivity within a unified 
framework. 
 This article provides this unified perspective on comparative living 
standards by offering an overview of the development of both real  
wages and labor productivity in Britain and Germany over the period 
1871–1938. More specifically, we first calculate benchmarks of the 
comparative real wages in the two countries by comparing nominal 
incomes using purchasing power parities from the expenditure side for 
1905 and 1937. We then estimate the comparative real wage of the two 
 
8 Feinstein, “Pessimism”; Clark, “Condition of the Working Class”; Allen, “Pessimism 
Preserved”; Gazely and Newell, “Poverty”; and Bean and Boyer, “Trade Boards Act.” 
9 Abelshauser, “Lebensstandard”; Wiegand, “Zur historischen Entwicklung”; and Pierenkemper, 
“Standard of Living.”  
10 Allen, “International Competition”; Buchheim, Deutsche Gewerbeexporte; and Labuske 
and Streb, “Technological Creativity.” 
11 Borchadt, “Zwangslagen”; Holtfrerich, “Zu hohe Löhne”; Ritschl, “Zu hohe Löhne”; and 
Broadberry and Ritschl, “Real Wages.” 
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countries for the period 1871–1938 using national time series of wages 
and consumer prices. For the economy as a whole, German real wages 
were around three quarters of the British level during the 1870s and 
remained at this level until the early 1890s, before then converging to 
around 83 percent of the British level by 1913. German real wages fell 
back to around three quarters of the British level during the first half of 
the 1920s, and although there was a recovery during the late 1920s, this 
was quickly followed by the Depression of the 1930s, which hit German 
workers much more severely than their British counterparts. During the 
Nazi period, the German real wage recovered to around 85 percent of the 
British level in 1937, the year of our second benchmark.  
 Throughout the period 1871–1938, then, the average British worker 
was substantially better off than the average German worker, but the scale 
of the British lead varied over time and across sectors. For the aggregate 
economy, the real wage gap was about the same as the labor productivity 
gap, but there were substantial differences across the main sectors. 
Compared to their productivity, German industrial workers were poorly 
paid, while German service sector workers were very well remunerated. 
This affected the competitiveness of the two countries in these sectors. In 
particular, the substantial rise of German industrial unit labor costs over 
the 1913–1925 period was heavily discussed during the Borchardt 
controversy.12 Our results confirm Knut Borchardt’s finding that 
comparative unit labor costs indeed increased substantially in Weimar 
Germany compared to the prewar period, particularly in industry. 
However, by considering levels as well as rates of change of both real 
wages and labor productivity on a comparative basis, we are able to show 
that German industrial workers were still poorly paid in an international 
perspective, given their relatively high productivity.  
 There were also differences in comparative real wages by skill level. 
Whilst most occupational groups were better paid in Britain, unskilled 
British industrial workers were as badly paid as their German counterparts 
before World War I, and this helps to explain the persistence of  
large pockets of poverty in Europe’s highest wage economy at a time of 
full employment.13 This changed with the improvement in the position  
of unskilled workers across World War I, although poverty remained  
a problem in interwar Britain because of a sharp increase in 
unemployment.14 
 
12 Borchardt, “Zwangslagen”; Balderston, “Origins”; Holtfrerich, “Zu hohe Löhne”; Ritschl, 
“Zu hohe Löhne”; and Broadberry and Ritschl, “Real Wages.”  
13 Booth, Life and Labour; Rowntree, Poverty; Gazeley and Newell, “Poverty”; and Bean and 
Boyer, “Trade Boards Act.” 
14 Linsley and Linsley, “Booth, Rowntree, and Llewellyn Smith”; and Boyer, “Living 
Standards.” 
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BENCHMARK ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE REAL WAGES IN 1905 
AND 1937 
 
 Our benchmark estimates for comparative real wages in 1905 and 
1937 combine data from several sources. The main sources for the  
1905 benchmark are enquiries of the British Board of Trade about the 
incomes and expenditures of working-class households in Britain and 
Germany.15 The basic procedure is to compare money wages in the  
two countries by converting them to a common currency using a 
purchasing power parity obtained by comparing the prices of goods and 
services in the two countries, weighted by their importance in consumer 
expenditure. This is necessary because the exchange rate cannot be 
assumed to be a perfect guide to differences in prices between two 
countries, particularly when there are non-traded goods and services.16 
The German expenditure shares are taken from a comprehensive  
survey of 852 households conducted in 1907 by Germany’s Imperial 
Statistical Office and the British expenditure shares are taken from  
the later detailed study of Alan Prest.17 Our 1937 benchmark relies  
on British price data and budget shares assembled by Richard Stone  
and D. A. Rowe.18 The German data are taken from a 1937 household 
survey conducted by the Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut der  
Deutschen Arbeitsfront.19  
 Tables 1 and 2 show the budget items included in our benchmark 
estimates of expenditure side PPPs, their prices in the two countries, and 
their shares. The rows showing the four main categories of food, fuel and 
light, alcohol and tobacco, and rent give the PPPs for the subcategories 
and the weights for each subcategory in total consumption.20  
 The PPP for 1905 is M 20.62 per £, only about 1 percent higher  
than the official exchange rate. For 1937, however, our expenditure side 
PPP is RM 17.19 per £, or nearly 40 percent higher than the official 
exchange rate of RM 12.30 per £. This is in line with the findings of 
Rainer Fremdling, Herman de Jong, and Marcel Timmer, who estimated 
a single deflated output side PPP of RM 18.40 per £ in 1935/36 for the  
 
 
15 Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry: United Kingdom and Report of an Enquiry: German 
Empire. 
16 Balassa, “Purchasing-Power Parity”; and Samuelson, “Theoretical Notes.” 
17 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Erhebung, p. 20; and Prest, Consumers’ Expenditure. 
18 Stone and Rowe, Measurement.  
19 Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Beiträge. 
20 It should be noted that although the budget studies include data on the expenditure shares 
of clothing and several kinds of services, they do not contain any volume information (such as 
numbers of shirts or cinema tickets) which would be needed for the calculation of PPPs. 
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TABLE 1 
 EXPENDITURE SIDE PPP FOR 1905 
Item Unit 
Price in 
Germany 
(pfennig) 
Price in 
Britain 
(pence) 
PPP 
(M per £)* 
German 
Budget 
Shares 
(%) 
British 
Budget 
Shares 
(%) 
Flour 7 lb. 107.5 9.00 28.66 2.2 2.1 
Bread 4 lb. 47.9 5.00 22.99 18.8 17.6 
Beef lb. 70.2 6.93 24.31 16.6 11.7 
Lamb lb. 65.5 8.25 19.05 7.5 1.3 
Pork and bacon lb. 84.1 8.00 25.23 5.3 22.3 
Eggs dz. 82.8 13.91 14.29 5.4 4.2 
Milk qt. 22.4 3.50 15.36 11.5 8.5 
Butter lb. 118.2 13.00 21.82 9.8 11.5 
Cheese lb. 63.8 7.00 21.87 2.8 2.3 
Margarine lb. 70.2 7.25 23.24 1.7 4.9 
Potatoes lb. 22.4 3.00 17.92 5.5 5.6 
Sugar lb. 20.3 2.00 24.36 6.8 2.6 
Tea lb. 231.0 18.00 30.80 0.6 4.0 
Coffee lb. 93.6 18.20 12.34 5.5 1.4 
Total food    21.92 55.9 56.2 
Coal cwt. 113.9 10.75 25.43 70.6 87.0 
Kerosene gal.   86.2   8.86 23.35 29.4 13.0 
Total fuel and light   24.90 4.9 6.6 
Beer pt.   17.5   2.57 16.34   
Total alcohol and tobacco   16.34 17.3 17.4 
Rent per room per week      140.5     16.50 20.43 21.9 19.8 
Total PPP   20.62   
*Exchange rate: M 20.43 per £. 
Sources: Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry: United Kingdom and Report of an Enquiry: 
German Empire; and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Erhebung. 
 
manufacturing sector.21 Jeffrey G. Williamson also found an expenditure 
side PPP of RM 18.08 per £ for 1927. 22 Moreover, it should be noted that 
Britain left the gold standard in 1931 and Germany introduced exchange 
controls at the same time. 
 
21 Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer, “Censuses.” 
22 Williamson, “Evolution,” p. 190. 
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TABLE 2  
EXPENDITURE SIDE PPP FOR 1937 
Item Unit 
Price in 
Germany 
(pfennig) 
Price in 
Britain 
(pence) 
PPP 
(RM per £)* 
German 
Budget 
Shares 
(%) 
British 
Budget 
Shares 
(%) 
Flour 7 lb. 143.3 16.00 21.50 4.1 3.6 
Bread 4 lb. 56.6 9.50 14.30 19.0 10.1 
Beef lb. 88.3 10.55 20.09 7.3 16.5 
Lamb lb. 101.3 14.15 17.18 0.4 9.0 
Pork  lb. 86.7 11.80 17.63 7.6 3.2 
Bacon lb. 100.5 15.20 15.87 3.6 10.2 
Eggs dz. 126.0 24.00 12.60 3.3 8.3 
Milk qt. 26.0 6.50 9.60 15.2 14.5 
Butter lb. 141.7 15.20 22.37 11.1 10.1 
Cheese lb. 42.2 10.60 9.55 3.3 2.3 
Margarine lb. 66.3 6.40 24.86 8.0 1.1 
Potatoes lb. 3.0 4.20 1.71 6.9 0.5 
Sugar lb. 35.7 2.50 34.27 7.0 3.5 
Tea lb. 462.7 26.00 42.71 0.4 6.6 
Coffee lb. 213.2 26.30 19.46 3.0 0.7 
Total food     17.74 66.9 52.6 
Coal cwt. 161.5 27.00 14.36 27.9 58.9 
Gas 1,000 ft.³ 567.4 42.00 32.42 32.9 23.3 
Electricity kw./h. 40.9 1.54 63.74 39.2 17.8 
Total fuel and light     32.95 7.6 7.9 
Beer pt. 37.8 6.00 15.12 57.0 54.1 
Cigarettes ten 22.1 4.99 10.63 20.3 37.2 
Tobacco oz. 26.7 9.36 6.85 26.7 8.7 
Total alcohol and tobacco     12.64 5.9 19.6 
Rent per room per week 169.3 33.08 12.28 19.6 19.9 
Total PPP     17.19   
*Exchange rate: RM 12.30 per £. 
Sources: Prest, Consumers’ Expenditure ; Stone and Rowe, Measurement; and 
Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Beiträge. 
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We use the PPPs from Tables 1 and 2 to convert German money 
wages for 1905 and 1937 into £s and compare them with money  
wages in Britain. The German nominal income data are taken from 
Walther G. Hoffmann.23 They are based on the income data collected  
by the compulsory accident insurance, and are provided here for the 
aggregate economy, the three major sectors, and a number of industrial 
and service subsectors. The British data for 1905 are taken from  
Charles Feinstein, who gives information about the average annual  
full employment earnings in 1911 for the major sectors and branches  
of the economy as well as employment in 1911 in those branches.24  
The benchmark estimate of money earnings in 1905 is obtained from 
Feinstein’s 1911 benchmark, projected back to 1905 using Feinstein’s 
wage index. The British data for 1937 are taken from Feinstein, drawing 
where necessary on Agatha Chapman for the sectoral breakdown.25 
 Table 3 shows the comparative wage income for Britain and Germany 
in the two benchmark years. For Germany, annual money wages for the 
aggregate economy were M 887 in 1905 and RM 1,850 in 1937. This 
compares to money wages in Britain of £54.64 and £126.29 in 1905 and 
1937, respectively. Dividing the German money wages by the appropriate 
PPPs of M 20.62 per £ in 1905 and RM 17.19 per £ in 1937 and then  
by the British nominal incomes yields a comparative wage of 78.7 
percent in 1905 and 85.2 percent in 1937 for a full-time equivalent 
employed worker in Germany. 
 Looking at the three sectors—agriculture, industry, and services—
yields the results that German agricultural workers were comparatively 
poorly paid in 1905, whereas German service sector employees were 
comparatively well paid. Comparative wages in industry were about the 
same as comparative wages in the aggregate economy, although there 
was some variation across industrial branches, with German workers 
well remunerated relative to their British counterparts in clothing and 
printing. The high comparative wages in the German service sector 
partly reflected pay differentials for civil servants, with employees in 
the government sector receiving 160.5 percent of the income of British 
civil servants in 1905.26 By 1937 German real wages had increased 
  
 
23 Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 492–95. 
24 Feinstein, “New Estimates.” 
25 Feinstein, “Changes”; and Chapman, Wages. 
26 In Germany, civil service, transportation, and distribution accounted for 6.2, 14.1, and 32.0 
percent (13.3, 16.1, and 36.3 percent) of service sector employment in 1905 (1937), respectively 
(see Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 203–06). In the United Kingdom, government, transport and 
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TABLE 3 
BENCHMARK ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE ANNUAL WAGES 
 
German 
Nominal 
Wage 
(marks) 
British 
Nominal 
Wage  
(£) 
German Wage 
as Percent of 
British Wage 
at PPP 
(£1 = M 20.62) 
 
German 
Nominal 
Wage 
(RM) 
British 
Nominal 
Wage  
(£) 
German Wage 
as Percent of 
British Wage  
at PPP 
(£1 = RM 17.19) 
 1905  1937 
Agriculture         551    37.64 71.0    1,030   86.32 69.4 
        
Industry 981 61.45 77.4  1,871 131.23 82.9 
Mining 1,205 74.02 79.0  2,433 158.38 89.4 
Construction 1,143 71.58 77.4  1,905 146.86 75.5 
Engineering and 
shipbuilding 1,113 94.54 76.4 
 2,245  140.1 93.2 
Iron and steel 1,232 85.18 70.1  2,312 161.93 83.1 
Textiles 637 43.86 70.4  1,278 90.93 81.8 
Clothing 790 37.26     102.8  1,344 97.12 80.5 
Printing 1,273 61.99 99.6  2,577 139.52    107.4 
Furniture 1,005 66.17 73.7  1,612 122.61 76.5 
        
Services  
(without military) 
 
1,106 
 
61.35 
 
87.4 
  
2,356 
 
127.46 
 
   107.5 
Transport 1,212 58.31     100.8  2,359 176.01 78.0 
Distribution 853 63.64 65.0  1,631 126.56 75.0 
Government 2,133 64.47     160.5  3,690 129.06    166.3 
Aggregate economy        887  54.64 78.7   1,850 126.29 85.2 
Sources: Wage data from Feinstein, National Income and “New Estimates”; Chapman, Wages; 
and Hoffmann, Wachstum. PPPs are from Tables 1 and 2. 
 
compared with their British counterparts in industry and especially in 
services, where real wages were now higher than in Britain. However, 
comparative Germany/U.K. real wages had fallen back slightly in 
agriculture.  
 
TIME-SERIES PROJECTIONS OF COMPARATIVE REAL WAGES 
 
 In this section, we project the 1905 benchmark forwards and 
backwards using national real wage indices for the aggregate economy 
and the three major sectors of agriculture, industry, and services. The 
German nominal income data for the period 1871–1938 are taken  
from Hoffmann.27 The British data for the period 1880–1913 are taken 
 
communications, and distribution accounted for 5.1, 18.4, and 28.6 percent (10.7, 23.7, and 43.5 
percent) of service sector employment in 1911 (1937), respectively (Feinstein, National Income, 
pp. T129–T131). 
27 Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 492–95; Wiegand, “Zur historischen Entwicklung,” discusses 
the quality of the various available nominal income series. Hoffmann’s, Wachstum, data are 
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from Feinstein.28 For the years 1871–1879 and 1913–1938 we use 
Feinstein’s wage index, incorporating the minor adjustments presented in 
his later article.29 The sectoral breakdown for the period 1920–1938 
draws on Agatha L. Chapman as well as the nominal wage data in 
Feinstein.30 To derive the German real wage index, we deflate the 
nominal earnings series from Hoffmann using Ashok Desai’s consumer 
price index for the pre-1913 period and the official cost of living price 
index of the Statistisches Reichsamt for the period 1924–1938.31 For 
Britain, the widely accepted consumer price index of Feinstein is used to 
deflate the nominal wage series.32  
 The results of the time-series projection of comparative Germany/U.K. 
real wages shown in Figure 1 are based on the 1905 benchmark. 
However, it should be noted that the results would not be substantially 
altered by projecting back from the 1937 benchmark, rather than 
projecting forward from the 1905 benchmark, since there is a high degree 
of consistency between the benchmarks and the time-series projections. 
Projecting forwards from the 1905 benchmark yields an estimate of  
the comparative Germany/U.K. real wage in 1937 of 83.3 percent, which 
is very close to the benchmark estimate of 85.2 percent, yielding a 
discrepancy of just 1.9 percentage points, well within the margins of error 
in this type of work.33 
 It is helpful to consider the trends in comparative real wages for the 
aggregate economy in three main periods. First, between 1871 and 1891 
there was no tendency for Germany to catch up on Britain in real  
wages, although there were significant cyclical fluctuations during this 
period. In particular, the Gründerkrise of the early 1870s had a sharp 
negative impact on the living standards of German workers. So also did 
the tariff on agricultural goods, which had a substantial impact on the  
cost of living. Between 1871 and 1891 money wages increased by 34 
percent in Germany, but only by 19 percent in Britain. However, 
 
similar to the data used by Phelps Brown and Browne, Century of Pay, and Desai, Real Wages, 
whereas Williamson, “Evolution,” p. 171, employs data from the building trades only.  
28 Feinstein, “New Estimates.” 
29 Feinstein, National Income and “Changes.” 
30 Chapman, Wages; and Feinstein, “Changes.” 
31 Hoffmann, Wachstum; Desai, Real Wages; and Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch. See Wiegand, “Zur historischen Entwicklung,” pp. 90–93, for a discussion of the 
indices and the longer working paper version of our article.  
32 Feinstein, National Income. 
33 Broadberry, “Relative per Capita Income.” It would also be possible to take the geometric 
mean of the results using the 1905 and 1937 benchmarks. However, since this would make so 
little difference, we prefer to retain the direct link to the observed data for 1905. 
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FIGURE 1 
COMPARATIVE GERMANY/U.K. REAL WAGE AND PER CAPITA INCOME  
(United Kingdom = 100) 
 
Sources: Comparative real wage: authors’ own calculations. Comparative per capita GDP: 
Maddison, World Economy, corrected for Burhop and Wolff, “Compromise Estimate,”  
and Ritschl and Spoerer, “Bruttosozialprodukt,” reestimation of German NNP. Maddison’s 
comparative data were corrected by dividing Burhop and Wolff’s (Ritschl and Spoerer’s) 
reestimation of German NNP for the period 1871–1913 (1924–1938) by Hoffmann’s, 
Wachstum, NNP series, which was used by Maddison. The resulting correction factor was 
multiplied with Maddison’s series. 
 
whereas the cost of living fell by 15 percent in Britain, it remained 
stable in Germany. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these 
divergent trends in the cost of living were related to the different 
reactions in Britain and Germany to the possibility of cheap grain 
imports from the United States.34 For example, the price of bread 
remained constant in Germany from the early 1870s to World War I, 
whereas it declined by about one-third in Britain between the early 
1870s and the early 1890s and remained constant thereafter.35 
 Figure 1 graphs comparative GDP per capita. Over the period  
1871–1938 as a whole, there is broad agreement between comparative 
living standards measured by both GDP per capita and the real  
wage. Nevertheless, there are some differences over shorter periods.  
In contrast to the stagnating comparative real wage between the early 
1870s and the early 1890s, the trend in Germany/U.K. comparative 
GDP per capita was more clearly positive. This can be explained partly 
 
34 O’Rourke, “European Grain Invasion.” 
35 Desai, Real Wages, pp. 118–19; and Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 770.  
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by the diverging trends of the price ratio of agricultural and industrial 
goods in Germany.36 Between 1871 and 1891 the price index for German 
agricultural goods increased by about eight percent, whereas the price 
index for industrial goods decreased by about 26 percent. This led to 
downward pressure on real wages compared to real GDP per capita  
since agricultural goods had a higher weight in a consumer price index 
compared to the national product deflator. Moreover, diverging trends in 
labor force participation also played a part in explaining the gap between 
real wages and GDP per capita. Thus a high comparative real wage in 
Germany compared to Britain was consistent with a low comparative  
real per capita GDP so long as labor force participation was also lower  
in Germany. Labor force participation was in fact much higher in Britain 
than in Germany during the 1870s and 1880s, but both countries 
converged to similar levels over time. More specifically, British labor 
force participation decreased from 52.9 percent in 1871 to 48.6 percent  
in 1891, whereas German labor force participation increased from 42.3 
percent in 1871 to 45.2 percent in 1891.37 Therefore, the gap in labor 
force participation declined from 10.6 percentage points in 1871 to only 
3.4 percentage points in 1891.  
 Between 1891 and 1913 there was a clear upward trend in the ratio of 
German to British real wages, from 72.1 percent to 83.3 percent of the 
British level. Although the cost of living rose more rapidly in Germany 
than in Britain during this period, money wages increased even more 
rapidly in Germany compared with Britain, confirming the hypothesis 
of a German catch-up to Britain during the Edwardian period. 
 There was a period of disorder between 1913 and 1925, during  
which German real wages suffered a major setback. By 1925 the 
comparative real income position of a German worker had fallen back 
to 76 percent of the British level versus 83.3 percent in 1913. Although 
Germany/U.K. comparative real wages recovered by 1928, the Great 
Depression hit Germany much more severely than Britain. The 
Germany/U.K. comparative real wage fell but staged a strong recovery 
during the Nazi period. In particular, the functional distribution of 
income changed substantially during the Great Depression and the Nazi 
recovery. From the late 1920s until the mid-1930s, comparative per 
capita income declined faster than comparative real wages, indicating a 
stronger impact of the Depression on profits than on wages. Thereafter, 
the picture reversed.  
 David Khoudour-Castéras has recently suggested that Bismarck’s 
social legislation had an impact on German emigration before World  
 
36 See Jacobs and Richter, Grosshandelspreise, for the price indices. 
37 Feinstein, National Income, tables 55 and 57; and Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 173–74, 205–06. 
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War I, by providing “indirect wages” which need to be added to the 
“direct wages” considered so far.38 The benchmark estimates of 
comparative real wages in Table 3 and the time-series projections in 
Figures 1 and 2 assume a similar ratio of taxes, social security benefits, 
unemployment, and working hours in the two countries. To what extent 
would the calculation of a “total wage,” including the indirect wage, 
change the picture?  
 In fact, the difference between direct wages and total wages  
including the net benefits of the social security system would be rather 
small, simply because workers paid contributions as well as receiving  
benefits. And to the extent that the costs of the social security system 
fell partly on firms as well as workers, they depended on distortionary 
taxation, the effects of which have to be set against any apparent excess 
of benefits over contributions experienced by workers. The first thing  
to note is that contributions and benefits were both tiny for the  
pre-1914 period, in Germany as well as in Britain. Khoudour-Castéras  
claims that the ratio of indirect to direct wages in Germany rose from 
just 2.55 percent in 1885 to 5.85 percent in 1913, but he only considered 
employees covered by the insurance scheme. Since most employees 
were not covered by the insurance scheme, indirect wages would  
be a much smaller percentage of the average wage for all workers.  
Indeed, the net transfer of income towards workers using the firms’ 
contributions and taxpayers’ money was less than 1 percent of  
wages until 1913.39 During the interwar period, data published by  
the Statistisches Reichsamt show that net transfers were on average  
3.2 percent of wages between 1925 and 1938.40 Thus, redistribution 
schemes operated on a very small scale until World War II. 
 In 1913 average social security contributions in Germany were 3 and 
4.8 percent for blue-collar and white-collar employees, respectively. In 
Britain before World War I, the shares of income taxes and national 
insurance contributions were somewhat lower than in Germany, with 
people earning less than £160 per year (around twice the average wage) 
paying no income tax in 1913.41 Social security contributions were 
introduced in Britain only with the National Insurance Act of 1911, 
which applied to just 2.3 million largely skilled workers by 1914.42 
 
38 Khoudour-Castéras, “Welfare State.” 
39 Reuter, “Verteilungs- und Umverteilungseffekte.” 
40 Own calculations based on information given in Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch (various issues). Details are available upon request from the authors.  
41 Mallet, British Budgets, p. 484. 
42 Thane, Foundations, p. 88. 
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Furthermore, rates were low, working out at just 1.89 percent of income 
for someone on £150 per year.43  
 For the interwar period, the social security system clearly became 
more important, but again our conclusion is that the net effect of 
benefits and contributions was small and within the margins of error  
of international comparative real wage data. In Germany, average social 
security contributions remained constant across World War I, with  
blue-collar and white-collar employees contributing 3 and 4.8 percent in 
1924 as well as in 1913. Thereafter, social security contributions of both 
groups increased to about 8 percent in 1929, and finally to about 9 
percent from 1933.44 In addition, income taxes were substantially higher 
during the interwar period. Most employees paid no income taxes 
during the pre-1913 period, whereas the income tax rate for a married 
worker with two children and average income was about 4.5 percent in 
1924 and 2–3 percent from 1925 until 1938. Thus, in Germany, taxes 
and social security contributions doubled from about 5 percent in 1913 
to about 10 percent during the interwar period.45 In Britain, those with 
incomes below £250 per year in 1937 (again around twice the average 
wage) paid 2.7 percent in all direct taxes, including income tax and 
national insurance contributions.46 
 We also need to consider the impact of unemployment, since we  
are comparing full employment wages. In both countries, unemployment 
rates were very low during the pre-1914 period. Between 1900 and 1913 
unemployment averaged about 4 percent in Germany and 4.4 percent in 
Britain.47 For the interwar period, however, large differences emerged 
between the two countries. Between 1924 and 1938 the unemployment 
rate averaged 17.6 percent in Germany, fluctuating strongly.48 In Britain, 
average unemployment was much higher than before the war, at 10.1 
percent, but substantially lower than in Germany, particularly during  
the early 1930s.49 German workers were therefore more strongly affected 
by unemployment than British workers during the interwar period. 
 
43 Harris, Unemployment and Politics, p. 380. 
44 Müller, Nivellierung und Differenzierung, p. 132. 
45 Scholz, “Lohn und Beschäftigung,” pp. 298–99, calculates average income tax and social 
security contributions for skilled and unskilled German workers in 1913 and 1924. In 1913 
(1924) skilled workers had deductions of 6.2 (10.3) percent, whereas unskilled workers had 
deductions of 5.0 (9.7) percent. Hachtmann, “Lebenshaltungskosten,” presents time series of 
average income tax and social security contributions for the period 1928–1944. He shows that 
average deductions increased from 11.5 percent in 1928 to 14.0 percent in 1938.  
46 Barna, Redistribution of Incomes, pp. 127, 135. 
47 Pierenkemper, “Standard of Living,” p. 58; and Feinstein, National Income, pp. T125–
T126. Boyer and Hatton, “New Estimates,” using a larger sample of industries, suggest a 
slightly higher average rate of 6.2 percent for these years, but with less volatility. 
48 Petzina, “Arbeitslosigkeit,” p. 242. 
49 Feinstein, National Income, p. T125. 
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However, to the extent that the social security system provided insurance 
against unemployment, the comparative welfare effects of this would 
have been more limited than if the differential unemployment had 
occurred before World War I. 
 Turning to hours worked, Michael Huberman and Chris Minns 
suggest that Germans worked longer hours than Britons before World 
War I, but shorter hours between the wars.50 In the United Kingdom, 
hours worked declined from 2,755 hours per year in 1870 to 2,656 
hours in 1913, and further to 2,200 hours in 1938. The comparable 
figures for Germany are 3,284 hours in 1870, 2,723 hours in 1913, and 
2,187 hours in 1938. German employees thus worked about 19 percent 
more than their British counterparts in 1870, about 2.2 percent more  
in 1913, but about 1 percent less in 1938. The 1913 and 1938 figures 
suggest that accounting for differences in hours worked would have 
little effect on comparative living standards, but the scale of the 
difference is more substantial in 1870. However, it should be noted that 
Huberman’s study, on which these estimates for the earlier years are 
based, does not cover agriculture, which accounted for around half of 
all employment in Germany, compared with little more than 20 percent 
in Britain.51 Furthermore, Huberman’s study covers very few service 
occupations, with relatively well treated civil servants being a notable 
omission. 
 Taken together, the social security system, unemployment, and hours 
worked are not critical in an assessment of comparative living standards 
in Britain and Germany for the pre-1914 period. Although German 
workers did pay higher taxes and social security contributions and 
worked longer hours before 1914, they also received higher benefits. And 
more importantly, the magnitudes involved were relatively small. For the 
interwar period, although working hours became more similar in both 
countries, tax rates, social security contributions, and unemployment all 
became more significant in both countries and impacted more negatively 
on German workers than their British counterparts. Consequently, our 
calculations based on the gross earnings of full-time equivalent workers 
may overstate slightly the true welfare of German workers between the 
wars. However, it is important to bear in mind that it is the net effect of 
benefits and contributions which matters for the calculation of indirect 
wages. 
 
50 Huberman and Minns, “Times,” p. 548. 
51 Hubermann, “Working Hours”; and Broadberry, Market Services, p. 25. 
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FIGURE 2  
COMPARATIVE GERMANY/U.K. REAL WAGE BY SECTOR  
(United Kingdom = 100) 
 
Source: See Appendix, Table A-1 of the longer working paper version of this article. 
 
REAL WAGES AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BY SECTOR 
 
 So far, we have used the annual time-series projections to provide 
annual estimates of comparative real wages for the economy as a  
whole. In fact, it is possible to do this at the level of the three main 
sectors. The sectoral data in Figure 2 show that German industrial 
workers received about the same proportion of the British real wage  
as the average across all sectors, while workers in German agriculture 
received less and German service sector workers received rather  
more. Indeed, by the outbreak of World War I, German service sector 
workers were better paid than their British counterparts, and this 
remained the case throughout the interwar period.  
 We now use the sectoral real wage data to analyze the relationship 
between comparative real wages and comparative labor productivity, 
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deriving comparative unit labor costs in Table 4. This will enable us  
to address issues of the competitiveness of the German and British 
economies in the main sectors of the economy. To do this, however, it  
is necessary to compute comparative own product real wages for each 
sector, using producer prices rather than the consumer prices used  
in Table 3. Sectoral wholesale price indices are taken from Brian 
Mitchell for Britain and Statistisches Reichsamt for Germany.52 For 
both countries, the wholesale price index for foodstuffs is used to 
deflate agricultural wages, the wholesale price index for materials is 
used to deflate industrial wages, while service sector and total wages are 
deflated by the overall wholesale price index. Comparative levels in 
1905 are obtained using PPPs for industry from Broadberry and Burhop 
and for agriculture from Patrick O’Brien and Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura.53 The PPP used for services and the aggregate economy is a 
weighted average of the PPPs for agriculture and industry, using the 
geometric means of the employment shares in Britain and Germany as 
weights.  
 The results are presented in the first panel of Table 4. Although  
there are some minor differences from the comparative real wages 
calculated using consumer prices, the broad pattern of comparative own  
product real wages is quite similar, with German service sector workers 
better remunerated than average, German agricultural workers less well 
remunerated than average, and German industrial workers receiving 
about the same proportion of the British real wage as the average across 
all sectors. 
 The second panel of Table 4 then sets out the data on Germany/U.K. 
comparative labor productivity for a number of years between 1881 and 
1937, taken from Broadberry.54 German labor productivity had converged 
to the British level in industry by the end of the nineteenth century,  
but Germany’s overall labor productivity remained substantially lower 
because of a substantial productivity gap in agriculture and services.  
This sectoral pattern of comparative productivity performance persisted  
across World War I and throughout the interwar period. Combining this 
comparative productivity data with the information on comparative own 
 
 
52 Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 725–26; and Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1926 (p. 263), 1931 (p. 256), and 1939 (p. 363). 
53 Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity”; and O’Brien and Prados de la 
Escosura, “Agricultural Productivity.”  
54 Broadberry, Market Services. 
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TABLE 4 
GERMANY/U.K. COMPARATIVE UNIT LABOR COSTS 
 
A. Comparative own product real wage 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
Aggregate 
Economy 
1881 68.5 74.8 82.4 71.4 
1891 54.7 65.2 74.0 61.5 
1901 69.4 69.1 90.2 77.0 
1911 71.5 95.0 100.1 89.1 
1925 65.3 72.5 91.3 72.9 
1929 75.7 82.5 101.6 84.1 
1935 53.3 70.8 85.9 67.5 
1937 62.0 83.9 99.9 79.4 
 
B. Comparative labor productivity 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
Aggregate 
Economy 
1881 54.7 93.7 61.3 57.3 
1891 53.7 99.3 64.4 60.5 
1901 67.2 105.0 71.9 68.4 
1911 67.3 127.7 73.4 75.5 
1925 53.8 92.3 76.5 69.0 
1929 56.9 97.1 82.3 74.1 
1935 57.2 99.1 85.7 75.7 
1937 59.0 96.9 89.4 79.2 
 
C. Comparative unit labor costs 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
Aggregate 
Economy 
1881 125.1 79.8 134.5 124.6 
1891 101.9 65.7 114.8 101.7 
1901 103.3 65.8 125.5 112.6 
1911 106.3 74.4 136.4 118.0 
1925 121.4 78.5 119.4 105.7 
1929 133.1 84.9 123.4 113.5 
1935 93.1 71.5 100.3 89.2 
1937 105.2 86.5 111.7 100.3 
Notes: Comparative unit labor costs derived as the ratio of comparative own product real wage 
to comparative labor productivity. 
Sources: Comparative own product real wage: see the text; comparative labor productivity from 
Broadberry, Market Services, p. 21.  
 
product real wages yields the data on comparative unit labor costs in  
the third panel of Table 4. The ratio was around 100 for the aggregate 
economy in 1891, 1925, and 1937, indicating that over the long run, on 
average, German workers were remunerated broadly in line with their 
comparative productivity level.  
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 It is interesting, however, to consider the ratio in the three main 
sectors. To the extent that comparative real wages were higher than 
comparative labor productivity, a sector was likely to have difficulty 
competing internationally. This seems to have been the case—with 
1935 being the only exception—for German agriculture throughout  
the period, which is consistent with what we know about tariffs and 
high food prices in Germany. However, it was even more strongly  
the case for services, where we have already noted the comparatively  
high levels of remuneration in Germany. The economic effects of this 
were far reaching, since high service sector wages meant that Germany 
was internationally uncompetitive in private services, which remained a 
comparatively small part of the German economy.55 Britain, by contrast, 
had a large, internationally competitive service sector throughout this 
period. In industry, however, the situation was exactly the opposite of 
that in services, with German workers poorly paid compared to their 
labor productivity. This resulted in difficulties for British industry, 
facing a strong competitive threat from German industry already during 
the “Made in Germany” scare of the 1890s.56  
 Unit labor costs play a central role in the Borchardt controversy. 
Borchardt hypothesized that hourly industrial wages were higher in 
interwar Germany than in prewar Germany, whereas labor productivity 
was lower.57 As a consequence of high unit labor costs, investment  
was low and unemployment high in Weimar Germany. Thus, high  
unit labor costs contributed to the downfall of Weimar Germany.  
Much of the early controversy remained tightly within the confines of 
Borchardt’s framework, using alternative data to dispute the changes in 
labor productivity or real wages within Germany between 1913 and  
the 1920s.58 Although a number of later contributions placed the debate 
within an international comparative framework, they continued to focus 
on rates of change of unit labor costs. Thus Theo Balderston claimed 
that the increase of unit labor costs compared to 1913 was lower in 
Germany than in Britain until 1927, and only became higher during 
1928–1930, while Broadberry and Albrecht Ritschl argued that similar 
increases in unit labor costs in both Britain and Germany help to explain 
the failure of both countries to benefit from the catch-up possibilities 
opened up by rapid U.S. productivity growth.59  
 
55 Broadberry, “Explaining Anglo-German Productivity.”  
56 Williams, Made in Germany.  
57 Borchardt, “Zwangslagen.” 
58 Holtfrerich, “Zu hohe Löhne”; and Ritschl, “Zu hohe Löhne.”  
59 Balderston, “Origins”; and Broadberry and Ritschl, “Real Wages.” 
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 A major innovation of this article is to provide for the first time  
data on comparative levels of unit labor costs, rather than indices of  
change. A further innovation is that we can distinguish between the 
three major sectors of the economy. These innovations allow us to 
confirm some aspects of Borchardt’s view, but also to shed new light on 
the controversy. Thus our data confirm the view that unit labor costs in 
industry and agriculture grew faster in Germany than in Britain between 
1911 and 1925 as well as between 1925 and 1929, but they also show 
that comparative unit labor costs declined in the service sector. Yet,  
it must be remembered that services was the least competitive sector 
during the prewar period and it was still uncompetitive during the 
interwar period, so that shifting labor from agriculture and industry into 
services contributed to the overall decline of German competitiveness. 
In addition, the industrial sector experienced only a modest increase  
of unit labor costs between 1911 and 1925. Furthermore, taking account 
of levels, it must be emphasized that German industrial unit labor  
costs were still substantially below British industrial unit labor costs in 
1925 and 1929. Hence, although German industry did lose some of the 
advantage of cheap labor across World War I, it remained a low-wage 
industrial producer compared with Britain. 
 
 COMPARATIVE REAL WAGES BY OCCUPATION 
 
 The Board of Trade conducted an enquiry into wages and the cost  
of living in Germany in 1905, and made a direct comparison between 
Britain and Germany in that year.60 Table 5 sets out the weekly money 
wages for a number of industrial trades. It is interesting to note that the 
ratio of German to British wages was higher amongst the unskilled than 
amongst the skilled occupations. Indeed, amongst unskilled engineering 
laborers, the weekly money wage was the same in the two countries.  
 The implication is that the skill premium was higher in Britain. What 
does this in turn imply for the existence of poverty in Britain, which 
became a major political issue in the early twentieth century, following 
the social surveys of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree? Both 
investigators found around 30 percent of the working-class population 
living in either primary or secondary poverty at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.61 Of course, it must be recognized that the extent  
of poverty depends on where the poverty line is drawn, but the high 
 
 
 
60 Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry: German Empire.  
61 Booth, Life and Labour; and Rowntree, Poverty and Progress. 
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TABLE 5 
PREDOMINANT WEEKLY MONEY WAGES IN BRITISH AND GERMAN INDUSTRY, 
1905 
 
 German Wage 
Converted at  
Exchange Rate 
(s./d.) 
 
British Wage 
(s./d.) 
 
Ratio of Mean 
Predominant Wage 
(Britain = 100) 
Building trades       
Bricklayers  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d.  37s. 6d. to 40s. 6d.  75 
Masons  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d.  37s. 2d. to 39s. 4d.  75 
Carpenters  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d.  36s. 2d. to 39s. 4d.  77 
Plumbers  24s. to 28s. 6d.  35s. 4d. to 39s. 9d.  70 
Painters  24s. to 29s. 8d  31s. 6d. to 37s. 6d.  78 
Laborers  19s. 6d. to 24s.  23s. 6d. to 27s.  86 
Engineering trades       
Fitters  26s. to 32s.  32s. to 36s.  85 
Turners  27s. to 33s.  32s. to 36s.  88 
Smiths  28s. 6d. to 33s.  32s. to 36s.  90 
Patternmakers  25s. 6d. to 35s.  34s. to 38s.  77 
Laborers  18s. to 22s.  18s. to 22s.  100 
Printing trade       
Compositors  24s. 9d. to 25s. 11d.  28s. to 33s.  83 
All the above trades 
(average) 
    83 
Source: Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry: German Empire, p. xlix. 
 
rejection rate for recruits during the Boer War suggests that the poor 
identified by social investigators in the early twentieth century were 
indeed poor in an absolute sense. Furthermore, Rowntree found low 
wages to be a major cause of poverty, explaining nearly half of all 
primary poverty.62 
 Most work on the standard of living is not conducted within an 
international comparative framework, but once this approach is  
adopted, the existence of large pockets of absolute poverty in Britain, 
which was the highest wage economy in Europe at the time, becomes 
very surprising. If 30 percent of the British working class lived in  
such poverty around 1900 that they were unfit for military service,  
how much worse must the situation have been in Germany, let alone the  
less developed parts of Europe? Comparative studies on poverty  
are, however, in short supply.63 The only available study investigates 
pauperism in Britain and Germany in 1885. It turns out that 6.6 percent 
of the British population was counted as paupers, whereas only  
3.4 percent of the German population belonged to this category.64  
 
62 Boyer, “Living Standards,” p. 301. 
63 See Hennock, Origin, pp. 39–49, for a discussion. 
64 Ibid., pp. 46–47. 
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The main reason for being poor in Germany during the 1880s was  
illness or death of the breadwinner, whereas unemployment was 
comparatively unimportant: only 5 to 10 percent of poverty was related 
to unemployment, whereas illness accounted for about 45 percent of 
poverty cases.65  
 The evidence on comparative wages by occupational groups helps us 
to reconcile Rowntree’s and Booth’s findings of high levels of poverty 
in Britain around 1900 with the fact that Britain was the highest  
wage economy in Europe at the time. For unskilled workers in Britain  
were not any better remunerated in absolute terms than their German 
counterparts at this time. Rowntree identified the causes of primary 
poverty in York in 1899 and again in 1936.66 In 1899 nearly half  
of those living in primary poverty were in families where the chief  
wage earner was in full work but paid low wages.67 Low wages were 
similarly implicated in the extent of primary poverty in other pre-World 
War I social surveys, including Northampton, Warrington, Reading,  
and Stanley and Bolton.68 These were the unskilled industrial workers, 
who were paid no more than their German counterparts, while Maud  
F. Davies painted a similar picture amongst agricultural laborers in 
Corsley, Wiltshire.69  
 Across World War I, there was a major compression of the skill 
differential in Britain, with unskilled wages increasing by more than 
skilled wages.70 The factors behind this compression have been much 
debated amongst labor historians, but without reaching a consensus. 
Possible causes include the minimum wages introduced by the Trade 
Boards Act of 1909, the spread of the unemployment insurance system, 
the growing unionization of unskilled workers and the payment of  
flat rate increases to offset wartime inflation, as well as changes in 
technology affecting the demand for particular skills and access to 
education affecting the supply of skilled workers.71 Whatever the 
reasons for the compression, the effect was to remove one of the main 
cause of primary poverty in the pre-World War I period. However, this 
 
65 Frohmann, Poor Relief, p. 106. 
66 Rowntree, Poverty and Poverty and Progress. 
67 Boyer, “Living Standards,” pp. 301, 304. 
68 Bowley and Burnett-Hurst, Livelihood; Bowley and Burnett-Hurst, Economic Conditions; 
and Bowley and Hogg, Has Poverty Diminished.  
69 Davies, Life. 
70 The male unskilled wage increased from 61.8 percent of the skilled wage in 1906 to 73.6 
percent by 1924; Bowley, Some Economic Consequences, p. 149; and Routh, Occupation and 
Pay, pp. 88, 98, 132. 
71 Lovell, British Trade Unions, pp. 50–55; Bowley, Some Economic Consequences,  
pp. 148–55; Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 135–54; and Cole and Postgate, Common People, 
pp. 504–42. 
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did not have the effect of eliminating poverty in interwar Britain, 
because of the rise of mass unemployment.72 Low wages was the  
chief cause of poverty in just 9.2 percent of cases of primary poverty  
in York in 1936, compared with unemployment of the chief wage  
earner in 44.5 percent of cases.73 Unemployment was the main cause  
of primary poverty in many other interwar social surveys, including 
Northampton, Warrington, Reading, Stanley and Bolton, London, 
Merseyside, Southampton, Sheffield, and Bristol. 74 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This article provides a comparative perspective on living standards  
in Britain and Germany over the period 1871–1938, using a unified 
approach covering both real wages and labor productivity. For the 
economy as a whole, German real wages were slightly less than three-
quarters of the British level in the early 1870s. Between 1871 and 1891 
real wages grew at a similar rate in both countries, so that there was  
no catching up. After 1891, however, real wages grew more rapidly in 
Germany, with German real wages converging to around 83 percent of 
the British level on the eve of World War I. Following the war and 
postwar hyperinflation, German real wages fell back to about three-
quarters of the British level by 1924, and had recovered only to 83 
percent of the British level on the eve of World War II. On average,  
then, British workers were better off than their German counterparts 
throughout the period. 
 For the aggregate economy, comparative real wages were about  
the same as comparative labor productivity, but there were significant 
differences across sectors and skill levels. Compared to their  
productivity, German industrial workers were poorly paid, whereas 
German workers in agriculture and services were well remunerated.  
As a result, Germany was highly competitive internationally in  
industry, but had a comparatively small service sector which was  
not internationally competitive. Germany’s agricultural sector was  
kept artificially large only through substantial protection. By contrast, 
Britain’s industrial sector had difficulty competing with Germany,  
 
 
 
72 Broadberry, British Economy and “Emergence.” 
73 Boyer, “Living Standards,” pp. 301, 304. 
74 For Stanley and Bolton, see Bowley and Hogg, Has Poverty Diminished; for London, see 
Smith, New Survey; for Merseyside, see Jones, Social Survey; for Southampton, see Ford, Work 
and Wealth; for Shefield, see Owen, Survey; and for Bristol, see Tout, Standard of Living. 
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but Britain had a very strong position in internationally tradable 
services. Britain was also reluctant to forego the benefits of free trade in 
agricultural goods. 
 There were also important differences in comparative real wages 
across skill levels. Most occupational groups were substantially better 
paid in Britain than in Germany, but this did not apply to unskilled 
workers. Since unskilled workers in Britain received real wages as low as 
their German counterparts in the pre-World War I period, it is easier to 
understand the persistence of large pockets of poverty in Europe’s highest 
wage economy. Although unskilled wages rose relative to skilled wages 
in Britain after World War I, this did not eliminate poverty because of the 
emergence of the problem of mass unemployment. 
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